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The American social welfare institution is in transition. Constituencies
of the welfare state-the public, clients, and professionals-have regis-
tered dissatisfaction with traditional methods of providing services. Ana-
lysts from liberal and conservative think tanks have proposed relying less
on government and more on the private sector to provide for welfare. To
a substantial degree privatization is already evident in several areas: the
expansion of for-profit health and welfare corporations, the application of
entrepreneurial methods in community development, and the encourage-
ment of private retirement plans. The liberal response to privatization is
poorly developed, and could benefit from insights by welfare profes-
sionals who seek to make privatization consistent with a progressive
welfare agenda.
Social welfare in the United States is on the brink of sub-
stantial reform through privatization. For some welfare advo-
cates the use of the private sector to provide for the needy is
not particularly noteworthy. After all, private non-profit agen-
cies of the voluntary sector have been a part of American social
welfare for over a century. The importance of privatization is its
use by conservative ideologues to regressively reform welfare.
As a consequence of the indictment against the welfare state,
two principles have come to serve as benchmarks for welfare
reform. First, government should divest itself of its welfare
responsibility to the extent possible. Second, private sector
substitutes should be sought as a basis for welfare provision.
Together these principles represent a powerful strategy for al-
tering the welfare state.
Without a concomitant transfer of resources from govern-
ment to the private sector, however, privatization is unlikely to
promote the general welfare. Instead, it is more likely to be a
ploy to strip government of its mandated responsibility to care
for the needy. Perhaps the best testimony on the welfare re-
form ruse comes from David Stockman, former Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, who recently admitted that
a 1981 administration vow to protect welfare programs from
budget cuts could not possibly have been kept (Hoffman 1986,
p. A3). Complementing the deep cuts in federal welfare pro-
grams have been a host of private sector initiatives in welfare.
Significantly, relatively few of these have involved the welfare
agencies of the voluntary sector. As a result, privatization of
welfare has come to represent diminishing the welfare state
and relying on nonwelfare structures in its stead. This, of
course, has grave consequences for social welfare as it has
come to be understood in the United States. Fifty years after its
inception, the welfare state is being reformed through
"privatization."
AMBIVALENT CONSTITUENTS
A fundamental problem of the welfare state has been the
loss of support by constituencies essential to its survival: the
public, human service professionals, and beneficiaries. The ero-
sion of public support has been documented by Philip AuClaire
who examined National Opinion Research Center (NORC) polls
from 1976 to 1982, concluding that "the findings accurately
reflect the ambivalence of public attitudes toward the welfare
state." In 1976 the overwhelming sentiment (regardless of age,
education, sex, income, and political party affiliation of re-
spondents) was that too much was spent on social welfare. Only
nonwhite respondents thought too little was spent on social
welfare. Surprisingly, 51 percent of low-income respondents,
those making less than $10,000, opposed social welfare spend-
ing. While the number of respondents who thought too much
was spent on social welfare had dropped from 60 percent in 1976
to 48 percent in 1982, opposition to social welfare spending was
second only to opposition to foreign aid spending. Thus while
public attitudes toward the welfare state improved relatively, in
an absolute sense perceptions that welfare programs were still
too expensive remained strong (AuClaire 1984). In analyzing
data from a 1983 NORC survey, Ben Wattenberg noted that only
34 percent of respondents said they thought the government
should be more active in solving problems, and 43 percent
thought we were "spending too much on welfare," (Wattenberg
1983, p. A17). In a longitudinal assessment of the conservative
ideological tilt, John Robinson noted that, while the change
seemed slight, it had been consistent across polls taken by major
public opinion surveyors. Significantly, perceptions about gov-
ernment response to the needy have changed. "The 1983
[NORC] study repeated four questions about an expanded role
for federal government (versus more individual responsibility)
in social programs that had been asked only once before (1975);
support was down about 10 percentage points for each item
(Robinson 1984, p. 15).
Compounding public ambivalence has been the defection
of many professionals from the welfare state. For many profes-
sionals-even those committed to the principles and values of
the welfare state-the situation has become untenable. Trapped
in agencies where professional values are often compromised by
bureaucratic norms and where resources allocated for client care
are secondary to those required for organizational maintenance,
many human service personnel have surrendered their idealism
and quit. Until recently, this professional migration has been
relatively limited. Disenchanted with governmental agencies,
some professionals returned to private nonprofit agencies of the
voluntary sector. Professionals seeking even more indepen-
dence than that allowed by the voluntary sector have estab-
lished private practices, rejecting the traditional forms of service
delivery altogether. In 1975, the National Association of Social
Workers (NASW) estimated that from 10,000 to 20,000 social
workers were engaged in private practice (Gabriel 1977, p. 1056).
By 1983, Dr. Robert Barker, author of Social Work in Private
Practice, speculated that about 30,000 social workers, or 32 per-
cent of all social workers, engaged in private practice on a full- or
part-time basis (Barker 1983, p. 13). Another example of profes-
sional defection from the welfare state appears with the evolu-
tion of industrial social work in the private sector. "Social work
practice that is emerging in industry," proclaimed a study in the
new field, "is on the cutting edge of change in the profession"
(Skiomore 1974, p. 280). The first North American conference on
social work practice in labor and industrial settings, held in 1978,
"concluded that the future is promising for the growth and
expansion of industrial social work practice (Akabas, Kurzman,
and Kolben 1979, p. 34).
Finally, the experience of many clients of welfare state pro-
grams has been unsatisfactory. One study found that many
prospective clients fail to get past the waiting room of the typ-
ical agency. As a rule about 30 percent of the public seeking
assistance from an agency are referred to another agency, and
less than one-half of these prospective clients actually receive
substantive service from the agency to which they are referred
(Kirk and Greenley 1974, p. 441). For those who do become
consumers of program services, the experience is less than uni-
form. In another study, researchers found that one-fourth of all
clients made no use of services offered, one-third used services
well, and 40 percent used them partially. At best, fewer than
one-third of the clients could be considered to have received all
of the service they required (Hill 1971, p. 40). These findings
are similar to those of a client study concluding that 31 percent
of clients considered their "problem solved or less stressful,"
and 31 percent of staff terminated clients feeling services were
"completed." Forty-four percent of clients dropped out pre-
maturely, and 34 percent terminated for negative reasons (Bech
and Jones 1973, pp. 80-81).
CRITICAL THINK TANKS
Subsequently, influential policy institutes, or "think
tanks," began to reconsider the welfare state as the primary
institution for social welfare provision in the society. By the
mid-1970s, the correct role of government in social welfare en-
gaged the interest of liberal analysts. In 1977 Charles Schultze,
having been Director of the Bureau of the Budget in the John-
son administration and Chairman of the President's Council of
Economic Advisors under President Carter, wrote The Public
Use of Private Interest as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institu-
tion. In it, he argued that government intervention, through
higher expenditures and increased regulation, was inferior to
market strategies in dealing with social problems (Schultze,
1977). In 1978, the Urban Institute published Private Provision of
Public Services, a programmatic evaluation of non-governmen-
tal activity in several areas including social welfare (Risk, Kies-
ling, and Muller 1978).
While liberal think tanks sought to elaborate and innovate
welfare policies and programs, conservative think tanks cap-
italized on this with other objectives in mind. Leading the as-
sault on the welfare state has been William J. Baroody, Jr.,
President of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research (AEI). Citing the need to diminish the influence of
"the New Deal public philosophy" in national affairs, Baroody
commissioned several projects which proved highly critical of
governmental welfare efforts (Baroody 1985, p. 4). Within the
framework of the "mediating structures project," Michael Bal-
zano argued that the Older Americans Act diminished the vol-
untary impulses of church and community groups by subsidiz-
ing nutritional programs for the elderly. "In most cases,
common sense and the desire to help one's neighbor are all that
are necessary," Balzano concluded; "One does not need a mas-
ters degree in social work or gerontology to dish out chow at a
nutrition center." As director of the "project on democratic
capitalism," Michael Novak has argued that government in-
come redistribution policies, designed to aid the poor, are "na-
ive" and inferior to market mechanisms for distribution of
wealth (Novak 1981, p. 9).
Complementing AEI, the Heritage Foundation has taken a
more militant position regarding reforming social welfare by
advocating the transfer of responsibility for welfare from gov-
emnment to business. Implicit in this is an unqualified antag-
onism toward government intrusion in social affairs. Govern-
ment programs are faulted for a breakdown in the mutual
obligations between groups, the lack of attention to efficiencies
and incentives in the way programs are operated and benefits
awarded, the induced dependency of beneficaries on pro-
grams, and the growth of the welfare industry and its special
interest groups, particularly professional associations (Butler,
1984). In addition to proposing private sector analogues to gov-
ernmental programs-the substitution of urban enterprise
zones for urban development action grants, and individual re-
tirement accounts for social security, as examples-Heritage
has courted the traditionalist movement. In Back to Basics,
Heritage vice-president Burton Pines applauded local conser-
vative activists for their challenge to liberal values and chron-
icled the offensive launched against programs of the welfare
state (Pines 1982).
The loss of constituencies left the welfare state exceedingly
vulnerable to the conservative critique. For their part, the con-
servative think tanks went beyond the antipathy of traditional
conservatism for the welfare state, fashioning a more proactive
response-reform through privatization. To be sure, some of
the proposals waved about under the banner of privatization
suffer from implausibility. Heritage's director of domestic pol-
icy studies, Stuart Butler, for example, has suggested selling
public housing to tenants in order to raise money without con-
sidering how much, if anything, public housing tenants could
afford if they wished to buy into a project (Butler 1986). This
makes as much sense as trying to sell welfare departments to
relief recipients!
THE PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE
Quite apart from conservative rhetoric, privatization has
emerged as a significant phenomenon in social welfare. Its
clearest manifestation appears in the dramatic growth of health
and welfare corporations. This development represents the re-
alization on the part of the business community that profits can
be made in a growing human services market. The increased
demand for human services can be attributed largely to the
evolution of the service sector of the economy. Eventually, the
growing human services market presented promising invest-
ment opportunities for proprietary firms.
Government's use of the proprietary sector to provide ser-
vices is not a new feature of the welfare state. Jeffry Galper, for
example, suggested that government welfare programs actu-
ally "served the needs of private capital . . ." (Galper 1975, p.
27) over and above the needs of the disadvantaged. Notably,
corporate initiatives have attracted the attention of health pol-
icy analysts. Arnold Relman, editor of the New England Journal
of Medicine, has described the relationship between health care
corporations and government as "the new medical-industrial
complex" (Relman 1980). Following the theme, Paul Starr has
expressed concern about the growing influence of the "new
health care conglomerates" in defining the nation's health care
(Starr 1982, p. 448). In social welfare, Kurt Reichert has hypoth-
esized the emergence of "national corporations in social wel-
fare" (Reichert 1983, p. 413). In the most thorough analysis of
the subject to date, Neil Gilbert has considered the effect of
"welfare capitalism" on social welfare policy (Gilbert 1983).
Common to these works is the observation that the corporate
sector is assuming a larger, and somewhat different, role than
in the past.
As the proprietary sector expands to dominate select parts
of the human services market, a fundamental change occurs.
No longer passively dependent on government appropriations,
proprietary firms are in a strong position to shape the very
markets that they serve, influencing not only consumer de-
mand but also government policy. It is this capacity to deter-
mine, or control, a market that qualitatively distinguishes the
"new corporate welfare" from the earlier forms of business
involvement in social welfare.
Analyses of health and welfare corporations conducted by
the author reveal spectacular growth among most firms in this
sector. In 1983 thirty-seven for-profit health and welfare corpo-
rations were listed by Standard and Poor's as reporting annual
revenues above $10 million/year. During the most recent four-
year period for which revenues were reported, only two of the
thirty-seven lost money. Of the remaining thirty-five, thirteen
more than doubled their revenues, and eleven more than quad-
rupled their revenues each year! While most of the companies
focus on health-related services, many are diversifying into
other service areas; and, in some instances non-health and wel-
fare corporations are getting into corporate welfare to balance
their operations. Typically, corporate activity in the new
human service markets is characterized by rapid expansion and
consolidation (Stoesz Forthcoming). By 1984, the number of
health and welfare corporations with annual revenues exceed-
ing $10 million increased to forty-six; and, the revenues of the
largest proprietary provider, the Hospital Corporation of
America exceeded the total contributions to the United Way of
America. For-profit corporations are actively exploiting several
markets: nursing homes, hospital management, health mainte-
nance organizations, child care, home care, and life care. More
recently, proprietary firms have entered the correction and ed-
ucation markets.
A second example of privatization appears in marketing
community development. Here, governmental programs-
such as Urban Development and Action Grants and the Ap-
palachian Regional Commission-are faced with several com-
petitors which emphasize market strategies for development.
Of these, the most well-known is the Urban Enterprise Zone
(UEZ) concept. The origins of UEZs can be traced to the Adam
Smith Institute of England where an enterprising researcher,
Stuart Butler, elaborated the work of others who promoted
market strategies to community development. According to
Butler, economically disadvantaged areas would attract indus-
try by reducing taxes, employee expenses, and health and safe-
ty regulations (Steinlieb 1981). Imported to the United States by
the conservative Heritage Foundation, Butler came to the atten-
tion of Congressman Jack Kemp who convinced the Reagan
administration to make it the centerpiece of its urban policy. As
a replacement for Economic Development Administration and
Urban Development Action Grant initiatives, UEZ legislation
ran into opposition and is stalled in Congress at the time of this
writing. Consequently, the Heritage Foundation changed tac-
tics and promoted UEZs in states and localities. By late 1984,
Butler noted that 30 states and cities have created over 300
UEZs (Lewthaite 1984).
Other, less-publicized, initiatives have made important
contributions to community development. In the early 1970s an
increasing number of workers used the employee stock-
ownership plan (ESOP) to purchase companies threatening to
close down or transfer operations. The ESOP allows workers
and employers to make tax-deductible contributions to a trust
fund which can then be used to purchase stock for the em-
ployees. In this manner workers have been able to keep some
plants such as the Weirton Steel Corporation of Weirton, West
Virginia, in their home communities (Latta 1979). 1
Recognizing the tendency of community institutions in
poor areas to become dependent on government or phi-
lanthropy for continuing operations, the Ford Foundation
sought contributions from corporations to apply business prin-
ciples to social problems. By 1979, the Local Initiatives Support
Corporation (LISC) had received $9,350,000 from corporations
and foundations, and had committed funds to sixty-two dem-
onstration projects, including a fish processing and freezing
plant in Maine, a for-profit construction company in Chicago,
and a revolving loan fund to construct low- and moderate-
income housing in Philadelphia. If successful, these "en-
trepreneurial community projects" will attract "social invest-
ments" from public and private sources that will allow the
project to take on additional problems so long as it selects its
investors carefully, applies sound business practices to opera-
tions, and remains solvent (Local Initiatives Support Corpora-
tion 1980, p. 2).
Another example of private sector interest in community
development is the Enterprise Foundation. Begun in 1981 by
James Rouse, the Enterprise Foundation is designed to "help
the very poor help themselves to decent, livable housing, and
out of poverty and dependence into self-sufficiency." By 1984
Enterprise developed projects in twelve cities and had targeted
50 cities for intervention by 1987. What makes Enterprise un-
usual is that it is designed for self-sufficiency. Within the foun-
dation is the Enterprise Development Company, a wholly-
owned, tax-paying subsidiary. Profits from the Development
Company, projected at $10 million to $20 million by 1990, are
transferred to the foundation to fund projects (Enterprise
Foundation 1983, p. 1).
An important example of the privatization phenomenon is
the promotion of private pensions to assure income security
while containing the social security program. A justification for
emphasizing private pensions is the fear that social security
will not be solvent when the "baby boom" seeks benefits.
"While the working age population will increase at a rate of
only 0.4 percent between 2000 and 2025, the sixty-five and over
age group will grow at a rate of 1.85 percent," concluded AEI
researcher Norman Ture. "The ratio of persons sixty-five and
over to those in the twenty to sixty-four age group will have
increased by 50 percent, to 28.6 percent, in 2025 (Ture 1976, p.
6). Soon thereafter, Ture, as undersecretary of the Treasury for
the tax and economic affairs, observed, "We have assigned too
much responsibility to social security. It is time to examine the
prospects in the next 50 years or so of setting up a system in
which people are able and willing to provide more on their own
for retirement" (Ross 1981, p. G1).
The privatization of income security proceeded along two
fronts. First, social security growth was contained through the
selective trimming of benefits. Consistent with conservative
principles of welfare reform, Mickey Levy of AEI concluded
that "currently scheduled benefits should no longer be consid-
ered sacrosanct" and that "benefits [could] be trimmed selec-
tively so that truly needy recipients [were] not affected (Levy
1981, pp. 1-2). Modifications in social security pursued by the
Reagan administration followed Levy's retrenchment strategy
with several of these appearing in the final report of the Na-
tional Commission on Social Security Reform (Nordlineer
1983). Second, dependence on social security was diverted to
private pensions with the passage of the Economic Recovery
and Tax Act of 1981 which encouraged workers to invest in
individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Investors' response to
IRAs was swift. In December, 1981, Newsweek expected twenty-
five billion dollars to be invested in IRAs before the end of that
year, with another fifty billion dollars to be added during 1982
(Pauly 1981, p. 69). By June 1985 assets in individual retirement
plans exceeded $200 billion, approximately the amount ex-
pended in Social Security payments for the year (Poe and Se-
liger 1985).
While the diversion of capital to IRAs failed to reach a level
high enough to pull the economy out of the recession of the
early 1980s, the interest in IRAs vis-a-vis social security has
remained high among conservative privatization proponents.
Here, the Heritage Foundation has prepared an oblique assault
on social security. Under "The Family Security Plan," prepared
by Peter J. Ferrara, a senior staff member of the White House
Office of Policy Development, the initial IRA provisions of the
1981 Economic Recovery and Tax Act would be expanded to
allow individuals "to deduct their annual contributions to...
IRAs from their social security payroll taxes" (Ferrara 1982, p.
51). While substituting IRA investments for social security con-
tributions has not been well received by liberal politicians,
Heritage is banking on future support from egoistic workers of
the baby boom generation. "If today's young workers could
use their social security taxes to make . . . investments through
an IRA," wrote Ferrara, "then, assuming a 6 percent real re-
turn, most would receive three to six times the retirement bene-
fits promised them under social security" (Ferrara 1984, p. 7).
According to this calculus, the interaction of demographic and
economic variables will result in increasing numbers of young
workers salting away funds for themselves because of high
investment returns as well as a fear that social security will
provide only minimal benefits on retirement. If Ferrara is cor-
rect, the result is a sure-fire formula for eroding the popular
and financial support for social security, transferring depen-
dence to the market solution to income security.
ZEROING OUT THE WELFARE STATE
Given the trend toward privatization, what are the pros-
pects for social welfare in the United States? By most accounts,
they are not good. With the exception of Robert Kuttner who
believes that more governmental spending for welfare is desir-
able and that privatization is a flawed method for distributing
commodities to which citizens are entitled (Kuttner 1984), mosl
analysts would, for all practical purposes eliminate social wel-
fare as it has been known for the past half-century. Undei
various ideological labels, these suggestions lead to similar so-
lutions-zeroing out the welfare state. The sharpest attack on the
welfare state has been launched by Charles Murray. In Losing
Ground, an immensely popular book in conservative circles,
Murray advocates a "zero-transfer system" which "consists of
scrapping the entire federal welfare and income support struc-
ture for working-age persons" (Murray 1984, pp. 226-27). Sig-
nificantly, many traditional liberals have taken a careful look at
welfare programs, declared them counterproductive, and pro-
posed wholesale reform. Unfortunately, some of the prescrip-
tions have been carelessly conceived, despite the best of inten-
tions. Charles Peters, the quixotic editor of the Washington
Monthly and professor of neo-liberalism, advocates means-test-
ing welfare programs. "We still believe in liberty and justice
and a fair chance for all, in mercy for the afflicted, and help for
the down and out," explained Peters. "But we no longer auto-
matically favor unions and big government or oppose the mili-
tary and big business." In reviewing "income maintenance
programs like social security, welfare, veterans' pensions, and
unemployment compensation," Peters outlined the neo-liberal
position: "We want to eliminate duplication and apply a means
test to these programs. They would all become one insurance
program against need" (Peters 1983, pp. 247-248).
Robert Reich, a Harvard professor and advisor to the Dem-
ocratic party, defends investments in "human capital," but
thinks these should be tied to productivity. Restructuring
human capital investment, in other words reforming the cur-
rent welfare apparatus, involves a thorough retooling of vir-
tually every program.
For example, we can expect that a significant part of the
present welfare system will be replaced by government
grants to businesses that agree to hire the chronically unem-
ployed....
Other social services-health care, social security, day
care, disability benefits, unemployment benefits, relocation
assistance-will become part of the process of structural ad-
justment. Public funds now spent directly on these services
will instead be made available to businesses, according to
the number of people they agree to hire. Government bureauc-
racies that now administer these programs to individuals will be su-
pplanted, to a large extent, by companies that administer them to
their employees.
Companies, rather than state and local governments, will be
the agents and intermediaries through which such assistance is
provided (emphasis added) (Reich 1983, pp. 247-248).
AN AGENDA FOR WELFARE PROFESSIONALS
If privatization is to be more than a misguided notion that
worsens the already fragile circumstances of those dependent
on welfare programs, welfare advocates need to do several
things.
First, human service professionals must develop a body of
critical theory. In part the lack of popular support for social
welfare can be attributed to the inability of professional groups
to develop a capacity for rigorous self-examination which could
be a basis for corrective action. Part of the "welfare mess" is
due to the inaction of welfare professionals who, seeing prob-
lems in welfare programs first-hand, failed to take effective
action to clean them up. If the welfare-related professions are
to maintain their viability in light of privatization, they must be
willing to generate an internal debate about their purpose. For
welfare professionals, the failure to do so will leave the intellec-
tual base of their activity anchored to an arrangement of wel-
fare provision that is obsolete. Can welfare advocates identify
and cultivate the progressive potential in privatization (Don-
nison 1984)? To do so requires a reassessment of the role of
government, and other institutions, in caring for the needy.
Critical theory is a part of law and psychiatry (Barrett 1986;
Ingleby 1980);2 it should be a part of social work and public
administration as well.
Second, welfare advocates must reinsert themselves in the
social policy process. To an alarming extent, welfare profes-
sionals have lost control over the legislation that defines their
work. Such has not always been the case. Human service pro-
fessionals were architects of New Deal legislation and were
instrumental in fashioning legislation of the War on Poverty. It
is by default, then, that social welfare policies and procedures
are now defined by attorneys and economists who have little
appreciation for the circumstances of clients dependent on wel-
fare programs and professionals trying to serve them. Welfare
professionals and academics have been conspicuously absent
from the emergence of the privatization movement. Unless
they become engaged in the policy process, welfare profes-
sionals are likely to find themselves having to apply the contra-
dictory and counterproductive rules established through pri-
vatization legislation. The recently-announced Center for
Social Policy, established by the National Association of Social
Workers, is welcome in this regard, but its staff will have much
to do before it is able to compete on a par with the institutes
serving conservative interests.
Finally, welfare professionals need to modernize program
administration. The expansion of the service sector in the post-
industrial sectors of American society has been accompanied
by a revolution in how commodities are distributed to con-
sumers. Organizations that use communications technology,
task-group structures, and hybrid organizational forms are
more viable than those clogged with paper work, burdened by
bureaucratic super-structure, and legally restricted in opera-
tions (Gartner and Riessman 1974). Too much welfare pro-
gramming and administration is of the latter type, exemplified
by the public welfare department and the social casework agen-
cy. Welfare professionals would be prudent to modernize the
means of administration if they expect to obtain funding for
program expansion.
If welfare professionals are to regain their former status as
leaders in welfare reform, they must acknowledge the inade-
quacies of the liberally-inspired welfare state and propose prac-
tical alternatives to the conservative version of privatization. In
this regard privatization may prove less a threat and more an
opportunity for creating a more adequate social welfare
institution.
NOTES
1. Yet, the experience of these plants is different. In eight years of employee
ownership, Rath lost $23 million (William Serrin, "Employee Ownership
Dream Turns Bitter at Plant in Iowa," New York Times (June 17, 1984]).
Meanwhile, Weirton reported profits of S22.8 million six months after
employees purchased the plan ("Employee-owned Weirton Steel Has
2d-Quarter Profit," [Baltimore] Sun [July 18, 1984]).
2. With reference to American social welfare, Richard Cloward and Frances
Fox Piven have developed a radical critique of welfare policies but have
not addressed the welfare professions per se, perhaps because they are
not trained as such. See also, David Stoesz, "A Structural Interest Theo-
ry of Social Welfare," Social Development Issues (Winter, 1985).
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